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A typical scene: Two men are suspected of having committed a crime. They
are arrested and arraigned before an Alderman. Thereafter, the police take
written statements from each accused. Defendant No. 1 says that he saw De-
fendant No. 2 commit the crime, but that hc,. Defendant No. 1, had nothing to
do with it. This statement by Defendant No. 1 is read to Defendant No. 2, who
remains silent.
I pose two questions: First:-To what extent is this, or a similar case of
silence, evidence against a defendant as an admission of guilt in his criminal
trial in Pennsylvania? Second:-To what extent should silence be construed to
be an admission of guilt against a defendant in any criminal case?
The general rule, as stated by Wharton is "That, when a statement is made
in the presence and hearing of an accused, incriminating in character, and such
statement is not denied, contradicted, or objected to by him, both the statement
and the fact of his failure to deny are admissible in a criminal trial as evidence
of his acquiescence in its truth."'
Of course, the accusatory statement standing alone is hearsay so it is admissi-
ble, not as evidence of the truth of the facts stated, but to show the defendant's
admission by silence.2
At least as early as 1881, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania uttered the
famous maxim, "Silence, under certain circumstances, may amount to a tacit ad-
mission of guilt." Only a few years ago, this maxim was repeated, with apparent
approval, by Chief Justice Maxey.4 Recently Mr. Justice Horace Stern clearly
elaborated the general rule in Pennsylvania in these words, "When a statement
made in the presence and hearing of a person is incriminating in character and
naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged or contradicted by the accused
although he has opportunity and liberty to speak, the statement and the fact
of his failure to deny it are admissible in evidence as an implied admission of
the truth of the charges thus made." s
* A. B., University of Pittsburgh, 1938; LL. B., University of Pennsylvania, 1941; Assistant
District Attorney, Erie County, Pennsylvania, 1947.
I "Evidence in Criminal Cases" by Francis Wharton, lth Edition, § 656, p. 1089.
2 Commonwealth v. Vallone. 347 Pa. 419, 32 A. 2d 889 (1943).
8 Ettinger v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 338 (1881).
4 Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209, 19 A. Zd 228 (1941), opinion by the now Chief
justice Maxey.
5 Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A. 2d 889 (1943), majority opinion by Mr.
Justice Horace Stern.
NOTES
To this general rule, there are many exceptions or, at least, limitations. For
example, silence standing alone raises no legal presumption of guilt. There must
be other evidence of guilt before mere silence in the face of an accusatory state-
ment is admissible. As former Chief Justice Kephart revealed, "Ordinarily silence
when one is charged with a crime should not be received as evidence of guilt
and is not admissible for any purpose unless there is other evidence in the case
from which guilt may be inferred." 6 Also, if the circumstances indicate that the
defendant failed to understand the accusatory statement, the defendant's silence
cannot be construed as an admission of guilt.7 Thus an accusation made in the
English language to a person who understood only the Polish language could
not, in all fairness, be made the basis of an admission by silence. Furthermore, if
the defendant did not hear the accusatory statement, it would be unfair to con-
sider his silence as an admission of guilt. Whether the defendant heard the
accusatory statement "is a question of fact, unless it is shown positively that he
was within hearing distance, and there is no evidence that his hearing was im-
paired.""
If the defendant is not "at full liberty to speak" his silence is inadmissible.'
Hence, a defendant surrounded by several tough police officers who threaten
violence if he speaks might well consider it discreet to remain silent in the face
of any accusation. Nevertheless, the mere fact that a defendant was not present
voluntarily does not render his silence inadmissible if he was at full liberty to
speak. 10 As a matter of fact, most defendants are not present in jail, or police
offices or district attorney offices voluntarily; no doubt, they would much prefer
to be elsewhere. However, as long as full liberty to speak is granted a defendant,
he cannot complain because he is present involuntarily.
The accusatory statement must be such as would naturally call for a denial
and it must be reasonably apparent to the defendant that he is at full liberty to
deny it." This would seem to mean, at the very least, that the accusatory state-
ment must imply, directly or indirectly, that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged. Anything less might be a compliment and only the most modest of
defendants might see fit to deny it.
Silence, under the circumstances, must lead to the inference of the defendant's
assent to the correctness of the accusatory statement; if the defendant denies the
6 Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 325 Pa. 63, 188 A. 752 (1937), opinion by former Chief
Justice Kephart,
7 Commonwealth v. De Palma, 268 Pa. 25, 110 A. 756 (1920); Commonwealth v. Brown,
264 Pa. 85, 107 A. 676 (1919).
8 22 Corpus Juris Secundum § 734, p. 1261.
9 Commonwealth v. Aston 227 Pa. 112, 75 A. 1019 (1910)
10 Ibid; also see wealth ol authority cited in Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.
2d 889 (1943).
11 Commonwealth v. Coyne, 115 Pa. Super. 23, 175 A. 291, (1934); Commonwealth V.
Karmendi, 325 Pa. 63, 188 A. 752 (1937); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A. 2d
401 (1940).
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correctness of the accusatory statement, it is not admissible.12 But the statement
must be "promptly and explicitly denied""8 because "evasive and equivocal re-
sponses are tantamount to absolute silence." 14
In Pennsylvania a defendant in a criminal case cannot be compelled to
testify and his neglect or refusal to testify cannot create any presumption against
him, or be adversely referred to by the court or the attorneys during the trial.16
As a result, it is no surprise to learn that a defendant may remain silent in the
face of an incriminating statement made at a judicial hearing, and his silence
is not admissible in evidence against him." Regardless of the law in other juris-
dictions, however, the fact that the defendant has been arrested and is in custody
does not affect his silence as an admission.17 Only the further factor of silence
during a judicial hearing renders such evidence inadmissible."8
Such a brief resume of the law on this subject in Pennsylvania appears in-
complete without special attention being directed to the case of Commonwealth
v. Vallone.19 Apparently, there is no doubt that in April, 1941, Joseph Vallone
knowingly transported a female for the purpose of prostitution contrary to the
Penal Code of Pennsylvania. 20 After he was arrested, Vallone was brought from
the jail to the district attorney's office where, in the presence of a state policeman,
a local policeman, a county detective, and the district attorney's secretary, the
prostitute told in detail about her criminal experiences with Vallone. Vallone
sat through the meeting in silence. At the trial, the state policeman described
the above scene and the lower court allowed it in evidence as an admission by
silence. Vallone was convicted and sentenced. He appealed to the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania and on January 28, 1943, they reversed the judgment of the
lower court.21
Judge Kenworthey, in discussing what he called "the doctrine of assenting
silence," revealed that "the rule, to be sound in application to particular cases,
must be critically examined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of each
case by judges who assume somewhat the role of clinical psychologists. '2 2 Vallone's
silence was not admissible against him, asserted Judge Kenworthey, because of
these aspects of the case: "...(1) the meeting was deliberately staged for the
12 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 607, 64 A. 82 (1906); Commonwealth v. Mazarella,
279 Pa. 465, 124 A. 163 (1924).
15 Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1936).
14 Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A. 2d 401 (1940).
15 Act of May 23, 1887, P. L 158, 19 P. S. 631.
1G Commonwealth v. Brown, 158 Pa. Super. 226, 44 A. 2d 524 (1945); Commonwealth v.
Zorambo, 205 Pa., 109, 54 A. 716 (1903).
17 Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, citing a legion of cases on p. 422, 32 A. 2d
889 (1943).
is Commonwealth v. Zorambo, 205 Pa. 109, 54 A. 716 (1903).
19 Commonwealth v. Vallone, 151 Pa. Super. 431, 30 A. 2d 174 (1943), reversed in Com-
monwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A. 2d 889 (1943).
20 Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872 § 517, 18 P. S. 4517.
1 Commonwealth v. Vallone, 151 Pa. Super. 431, 30 A. 2d 174 (1943).
2 Ibid.
NOTES
purpose of procuring evidence, (2) the meeting was a relatively formal proceed-
ing, (3) appellant had been charged with the crime and was under arrest, (4) he
was present at the meeting under guard and under compulsion, (5) the only
persons present were hostile to him, and (6) he was not asked any questions
until after the meeting had been concluded."
2 8
The Commonwealth's appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
allowed and on June 30, 1943, they reversed the Superior Court.24 Mr. Justice
Horace Stern concluded that the six circumstances cited by Judge Kenworthey
"were important factors for the consideration of the jury in determining the weight
to be given to the defendant's silence under accusation, but they do not, either
singly or collectively, impair the admissibility of the evidence." 2 6
As of this date, later cases have followed the Supreme Court's decision in
the Vallone case without adverse comment' 6 except for the opinion of Chief
Justice Maxey in Commonwealth v. Barnak27 in which he said the evidence was
"much stronger in showing the probative value of unanswered accusations than
was the Vallone case."
So much for the status of the law in this regard in Pennsylvania; I turn now
to a consideration of its validity and suggested reforms.
Basically, the rationale of this rule is found in "the proverbial expression
that silence gives consent."
2'
Apparently, Mr. Justice Patterson deems it "the natural reaction of one ac-
cused of crime. . .to deny the accusation if it is unjust or unfounded." 9
Concerning such assenting silence, Mr. Justice Sadler once wrote, "the falsity
of the statements would naturally be insisted upon if, in fact, they were untrue."'
0
And Wharton: "The crystallization of the experience of men shows it to be
contrary to their nature and habits to permit statements tending to connect
them with actions for which they may suffer punishment to be made in their pres-
ence without objection or denial by them unless they are repressed by the fact that
the statement is true."'
' l
28 Commonwealth v. Vailone, 151 Pa. Super. 431, 30 A.2d 174 (1943).
24 Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A. 2d 889 (1943).
25 Ibid.
26 Commonwealth v. Brooks, 355 Pa. 551, 50 A. 2d. 325 (1947); Commonwealth v.
Turner, 358 Pa. 350, 58 A. 2d 61 (1948); Commonwealth v. Sams, 62 D. & C. 79 (1947).
27 Commonwealth v. Barnak, 357 Pa. 391, 54 A. 2d 865 (1947).
28 "Pennsylvania Trial Evidence", by George M. Henry, 3rd Edition, § 74, p. 116.
29 Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A. 2d 401 (1940). opinion by Mr. justice Pat-
terson.
80 Commonwealth v. Lisowski, 274 Pa. 222, 117 A. 794 (1922), opinion by Mr. Justice
Sadler.
1 "Evidence in Criminal Cases", by Francis Wharton, Ith Edition, § 656, p. 1092.
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And Mr. Justice Horace Stern: "The justification of this rule is to be sought
in the age-long experience of mankind that ordinarily an innocent person will
spontaneously repel false accusations against him, and that a failure to do so
is therefore some indication of guilt." 32
But Chief Justice Maxey, "I do not so read the record of 'the age-long ex-
perience of mankind' 88 and I am equally convinced that the cliche 'silence gives
consent' is an unreliable basis for a rule of evidence." For example, in his blister-
ing dissent to the Vallone case, the Chief Justice reviewed the record of history
from the silence of Christ before Pilate through the silence of Washington to
the charges leveled against him by Thomas Paine, and many more instances, only
to conclude that "many persons will neter answer any accusations made against
them (unless called upon to do so at a formal trial)." The Chief Justice cited
various authorities from other states "to the effect that a person in custody charged
with crime is under no duty to speak and that his silence shall not be counted
as giving assent." 8 ' The Chief Justice asserted, "If the ruling of the majority
opinion is the law of this Commonwealth, then any citizen no matter whether his
repute be high or his repute be low, is liable to find that if he hears with silent
contempt, or silent caution until he can consult with counsel, an accusation made
against him by even the most disreputable of individuals, his very silence will be
construed at his trial as an admission of the truth of these accusations." And, as
I view it, he concluded that prior Pennsylvania cases did not require the result
of the Vallone decision.
Finally, in order "to bring our law on this subject in accord with sound reason-
ing and the weight of authority," the Chief Justice suggested: "First, that the
silence of a person under arrest, in the face of accusations made against him by
a third party, shall not be used against him at his trial. . .; Second, that if there
are some extraordinary circumstances which make a defendant's silence in the
face of accusations against him consistent only with his acquiescence in them so
that no other explanation of his silence is reasonable, the evidence of silence may
be admitted, but in that contingency the jury must be carefully instructed as to
how to weigh that evidence."
Personally, as I view it, silence, under these circumstances, is so tenuous and
of such slight probative value and there are so many reasons other than guilt
which may cause a man accused of crime to remain silent that, I contend, such
silence should not be admissible. Even where such silence is coupled with extra-
ordinary circumstances which make the said silence consistent only with guilt,
82 Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A. 2d 889 (1943), opinion by Mr. Justice
Horace Stern.
8a Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A. 2d 889 (1943); dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice Maxey. All further quotations of the Chief Justice are from this famous dissent.
84 People v. Pignataro, 263 N. Y. 229, 188 N. E. 720 (1934), is indicative of the many
decisions.
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it would seem that the silence is cumulative only and that the proof of extraordin-
ary circumstances alone would suffice.
Only in this way, I think, can we maintain inviolate the cardinal principle
that "evidence must be such as to exclude to a moral certainty, every hypothesis
but that of guilt of the offense imputed."316
For who can deny that silence per se is a neutral factor and, as such, is
equally consistent with guilt or innocence?
as Commonwealth v. Benz, 318 Pa. 465, 178 A. 390 (1935).
